Abstract : This paper presents a general argument for a relevance-based approach to the problem of connectivity in conversation. First, the potential relevance of conversation for pragmatic theory is discussed, as examples in pragmatic theory generally consist of small conversations. A typical problem for conversation analysis and pragmatic analysis is the description of uses of pragmatic connectives. The French connective parce que is described using first a model of coherence (Ducrot's theory of argumentation) and second an inferential approach. With a view to improving these models, conversational uses of parce que are presented, which show some difficulties which coherence-based approaches face in attempting to make the correct predictions about common uses of connectives in conversation.This is explained in terms of, first, an implicit theory of conversation underlying Ducrot's theory of argumentation and second, relevance theory. The less discourse oriented approach (relevance theory) is better-equipped to account for conversation in general, and to solve the sequencing problem and the interpretive problem in conversation in particular.
Introduction
This paper is about conversation and relevance theory. It aims to provide neither a new account nor a new theory of conversation within relevance theory; this would be over-ambitious and contradictory to the general philosophy of relevance theory. My purpose is simply to give empirical arguments for a relevance based approach to conversation, and more precisely to two problems raised by conversations. First, the sequencing problem, which consists in explaining the connections between utterance-units in conversation, and more specifically the connections marked by discourse or pragmatic connectives. Second, the interpretive problem, which consists in explaining the relation between anutterance-type and its interpretation. In works on conversation, there is a great temptation to account for these two problems by means of specific conversational principles. I will show that this is not necessary, and that relevance theory provides a general framework quite able to account for these two problems.
The whole argument will be contrastive. I will begin the discussion of pragmatic connectives using Ducrot's traditional pragmatic description in a framework which makes the sequencing problem a central issue (his argumentation theory). More precisely, Ducrot's approach to conversation is crucially dependent on the ability of any pragmatic marker to connect a semantic content within a discourse segment with the use of the utterance (its "énonciation"), that is, the speech act realised and the act of utterance itself ("acte d'énonciation"). In this framework, the claim that connectives allude to discourse leads to a theory of language use which is oriented to discourse properties. The sequencing problem as well as the interpretive problem then receive discourse-oriented solutions.
In contrast, the solution which I will present is based on the same empirical domain (discourse connections), but imposes different interpretations on the data. In particular, the connections marked by 3 connectives receive a different explanation if we adopt an inferential approach. This approach is not discourse-oriented but inferential : what is at issue is simply what has been communicated by the utterance. The point of this paper is to compare the predictions of the two approaches with actual conversational uses of connectives. At first sight, it might be assumed that the discourse-oriented approach would be better suited to account for conversational data. In fact, the predictions of the discourse approach are not precise enough to solve either the sequential problem or the interpretive problem. By contrast, the inferential approach gives appropriate results, because it makes the sequencing problem an interpretive one and because it is compatible with the notion of conversational scenario which govern the use of connectives in conversation.
Before introducing the problem of connectives, I will discuss briefly the relation between pragmatic theory and conversation, and the relevance of conversation for pragmatic theories.
Conversation and pragmatics
Even though pragmatic theories are often based on conversational examples, it is too strong to claim that pragmatic theories are theories of conversation 2 . For instance, Grice's theory (cf. Grice 1975) makes specific claims about conversation (cf. the co-operative principle and the maxims of 2 There is an exception to this general state of affairs, provided by Levinson (1983) . Levinson devotes a whole chapter of his introduction to pragmatics to conversation. But it appears that the domain of reference is not formal philosophy or formal linguistics (which traditonally deal with topics like presupposition, implicature, speech acts, deixis), but sociolinguistics and micro-sociology, that is, theories of interaction, ethnomethodology, linguistic variation, etc. 4 conversation), but does not provide a theory of conversation. Conversation appears there as an idealised type of rational communication. The cooperative principle is concerned with communicative behaviours which participants in a conversation should respect, but it would be a mistake to assume that the conversational maxims are specific to conversation : Grice's theory is, rather, a theory of utterance interpretation. The interest of conversation, as far as the sequencing problem is concerned, lies in how the maxims of conversation are used in order to make the connection understandable or, in terms of the interpretive problem, in how the hearer has to exploit the maxims in order to make the intended inference.
Another pragmatic theory is relevance theory (cf. Sperber & Wilson 1986 ). Relevance theory, as I understand it, says nothing specific about conversation, that is, about its structure, its progression, the rules participants should obey when interacting, etc., although almost all examples given are small exchanges or dialogues. What relevance theory predicts about conversation is that, as one communicative device among others, it should not behave differently in terms of relevance. One of the important predictions that relevance theory makes about conversation is that no specific sequencing or interpretive principles should be necessary to explain conversational data. We can go a little further and say that, if human cognition is relevance-oriented, the conversational behaviour of participants should not escape the general relevance-orientation of cognition : utterances in conversation should be relevance-oriented. This prediction is at first sight counter-intuitive, and does not accord with the tradition of conversation analysis. But we will see that a strict analysis of conversational data makes it totally plausible and, furthermore, shows that relevance theory attains a higher degree of descriptive and explanatory adequacy than a discoursebased approach.
If pragmatic theories make indirect reference to conversation, can we say that conversation is relevant for pragmatic theory in general, and for relevance theory in particular ? This is the question I turn to now.
The relevance of conversation
The first point I would like to argue for is that conversation is not in itself an object of study. Rather, works on conversation focus on different types of uses of conversational data.
(i)
One tradition, which belongs to the sociological paradigm, uses conversational data as arguments for general cognitive and rational behaviours of social agents engaged in specific tasks (for instance, the decision-making of a jury in court). This tradition, conventionally designated as ethnomethodology, is typical of what Levinson (1983) has called conversation analysis. In this paradigm, conversation is not an object in itself, but is used indirectly to learn about human cognitive, social, and contextually dependent behaviours. The methodology of ethnosciences is classical, involving empirical and inductive reasoning.
(ii) A second tradition which has been concerned with conversation is termed discourse analysis by Levinson. This paradigm comes directly from linguistic methodology : the procedure is mainly deductive, model-theoretic, and independent of any social or cognitive factors affecting participants' behaviour. The main purpose of discourse analysis is to elaborate a rulegoverned model of conversation, proposing compositional rules or principles to explain the construction of compound discourse units from atomic units and functional principles to explain the pragmatic interpretation of discourse units. For instance compositional principles will explain the relations between conversational units (exchanges, moves and acts) and interpretive principles 6 will account for the allocation of illocutionary force to moves and acts 3 .
Here again, conversation is not an object in itself : conversational data are used mainly for descriptive and explanatory reasons. The problem is quite different with sequencing rules; no pragmatic theory has been concerned with discourse phenomena, nor has even 4 The argument is given by Levinson (1983, 290 Searle 1979) . This is in fact necessary to know more, precisely about the sequences of speech acts. It means that sequencing rules are not dependent on linguistic facts, but belong to the more general domain of the theory of action 5 .
5 This argument must be amended according to a proposal, which has not been developed, by Searle & Vanderveken (1985, 11) :
"But we will not get an adequate account of linguistic competence or speech acts until we can describe the speaker's ability to produce and understand utterances (i.e. to produce and understand illocutionary acts) in ordered speech act sequences that constitute arguments, discussions, buying and selling, exchanging letters, making jokes, etc.
For terminological convenience we will call these ordered sequences simply conversations. The key to understanding the structure of conversations is to see that each illocutionary act creates the possibility of a finite and usually quite limited set of appropriate illocutionary acts as replies".
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This short description of conversation analysis leads to the conclusion that the relevance of conversation for pragmatic theories cannot be determined a priori. In fact, we could argue that the sequencing problem, which is specific to discourse, is neither a linguistic nor a pragmatic problem, but depends on a theory of action; on the other hand, the interpretive problem is not specific to conversation, and is better described in a framework which is independent of conversational data. In this respect, conversation is not really relevant for pragmatics in general, and a fortiori for relevance theory. Nevertheless, if you made the presumption that my paper is optimally relevant, you might have inferred that I will argue that conversation has at least some degree of relevance for both pragmatic theory and relevance theory. This is exactly what I will argue. But I will assume that the general argument I have given so far is correct. So the relevance of conversation does not follow from discourse theory, but from some conversational data which provide counter-examples to certain theories of discourse. The examples I will give are mainly concerned with discourse connectives, and more specifically with interpretive uses of connectives which contradict the predictions of discourse analysis. The paradox we will meet is that conversation is relevant for relevance theory, but not for conversational or coherence theories.
Discourse connectives : a coherence approach
Such a research project on conversation is consistent with speech act theory, and has been developed in my earlier work on conversation (cf. Moeschler 1985) . The problem is that predictions cannot be made about types of speech acts as replies, but only about the degree of appropriateness of the replies.
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Discourse connectives, known in the French tradition as pragmatic connectives, have typically been studied within discourse theories 6 . What I will present here is an account of pragmatic connectives which assumes a central function for discourse routines or argumentation principles, that is, Ducrot's theory of argumentation (cf. Ducrot 1980 and Groupe l-l 1975). The central discussion will be about the discourse behaviour of because (parce que) in French.
The main semantic and pragmatic property of parce que (PQ) is that it gives rise to ambiguous utterances, which is not the case for its near synonyms car (for) and puisque (since) (cf. Groupe l -l 1975) . This behaviour can be seen in the following examples :
(1) Marie est heureuse parce que Jean l'aime.
"Mary is happy because John loves her"
The ambiguity is between reading (2) and reading (3) :
(2) John's love for Mary is the cause of her happiness.
(3) The assertion by the speaker that Mary is happy is supported by the (presupposed) fact that John loves Mary.
This difference is greater with interrogative and negative sentences :
6 The first work on discourse connectives within relevance theory was that of Diane Blakemore (1987) . For other descriptions of and proposals about the functions of pragmatic connectives in the framework of relevance theory, cf. Moeschler (1989a) and (1989b) , Luscher (1989) , Luscher & Moeschler (1990) and Luscher (forthcoming). (ii) in the case of negatives, (5a) denies a causal relation between John's love and Mary's happiness (it is possible to make a correction), while in (5b) it is asserted that Mary is not happy, and John's love is given as an argument supporting this claim.
These differences lead Ducrot to the conclusion that French parce que has two discourse functions : the first, which he calls a semantic operator, is to connect two propositional contents within a single speech act-unit (assertion, question, negation); the second, which he calls a pragmatic connective, is to connect two speech acts, for instance an assertion, a question or a denial and an explanation. This approach makes the following predictions regarding the relations between semantic information and types of reading :
the closer the semantic relationship between the two propositional contents are, the less likely is the pragmatic reading (the preferred reading is the semantic operator reading); conversely, the more remote the semantic relationship between the propositional contents, the more likely is the pragmatic reading (the preferred reading is the pragmatic connective reading). The marked case is illustrated by the so called "énonciative"
reading, as in (6) with reading (7) :
(6) Il y a du poulet dans le frigo, parce que je n'ai pas envie de faire à manger.
"There is some chicken in the refrigerator, because I don't want to cook dinner" (7) There is some chicken in the refrigerator, and I say that there is some chicken in the refrigerator because I don't want to cook dinner.
This type of analysis 7 is very convenient, because it is not necessary to explain the propositional relationship between semantic contents : the 7 The distinction between the "enonciative" reading and the performative one may appear tricky for a non continental reader. In fact, the distinction between an act of utterance and an illocutionary act is crucial in Ducrot's theory. Recall that in his "énonciation" theory, the meaning of an utterance (which is distinct from the signification of a sentence) is not its reference or the illocution it conveys, but consists of a image of its "énonciation", that is, the event which is at its very origine. For Ducrot, one way of commenting one's utterance is just to refer to the event of the "énonciation"; in this case, the motivation for an utterance to be used is the act which is at the origine of its production. This is what is called act of "énonciation". A good 13 connective gives a general instruction to connect two units, these units being either propositional contents (Q, P), or a propositional content (Q) and an illocutionary force (F(P)), or a propositional content (Q) and an act of "énonciation" (E(P)), as shown in (8) :
Unfortunately, there is a serious objection to this analysis. Consider example (9), which supposes a non-canonical relation between propositional contents :
(9) Jacques est tombé à mobylette, parce qu'il a le bras dans le plâtre.
"James has fallen off his motor-bike, because his arm is in plaster" example for such an auto-reference is given in French with the uses of the connective puisque ("since"). In the utterance Je pars, puisque nous nous sommes promis de tout nous dire ("I am leaving, since we decided to tell each other everything"), the connection has not as scope the fact that the speaker is leaving, but the very act of telling to the hearer that he is leaving.
The connection with puisque in French has not as scope the illocution. We cannot say for instance : *Est-ce que tu pars, puisque nous nous somme promis de tout noius dire ? ("Are you leaving, since we promised to tell each opther erverything ?"). Cf. Moeschler (forthcoming) for an explanation of these impossibilities.
14 The relevant reading, that is, the intended reading, is given by (10), which contrasts with the standard reading (11), which is also possible :
(10) James's fall is the cause of his broken arm.
(11) James's broken arm is the cause of his fall.
What is relevant here is the difference between reading (10) and the so called "énonciative" reading of (9), given in (12) : (12) James has fallen off his motor-bike and I say that James has fallen off his motor-bike because his arm is in plaster.
(12) has the semantic structure (8c), that is CAUSE (Q, E(P)). If this relation explains the first conjunct, that is, the act of uttering P, or E(P), the second conjunct (the cause of P, that is Q) is not motivated : the speaker only states its causal relevance. Moreover, if Q is not the cause of a particular P, but the cause of the act of uttering P, one should predict that any proposition Q could fit. Let us try, with Q = "Mary is my wife" :
(13) Jacques est tombé à mobylette, parce que Marie est ma femme.
"James has fallen off his motor-bike, because Mary is my wife"
Here, the "énonciative" reading given in (14) is very strange, and the only possible reading is the classical reading (8a) given in (15) :
(14) James has fallen off his motor-bike, and I say that James has fallen off his motor-bike because Mary is my wife.
15
(15) "Mary is my wife" is the cause of James' fall.
The reason, I would suggest, is this. The so-called "énonciative"reading of P, because Q is only possible where it would be reasonable to assert Q because P on a classical reading. In other words, I can assert that I say P because of the fact that Q only if I believe that P is the cause of Q. The question is how this constraint on the propositional content ot the "énonciative" reading can be explained 8 .
Example ( (ii) Negation : My thesis (cf. Moeschler 1991) is that a negative utterance of logical form (not P) gives rise, via a positive contextual assumption, to a contextual implication (not Q), in the following quasi-deductive schema 9 :
9 I call this schema a quasi-deductive schema (following Deirdre Wilson's suggestion) : if this schema is triggered by the fact that someone has say not-P, the conclusion which is inferred is not drawn from its propositional content alone. Contextual information (as contextual assumption) is necessary. Moreover, the schema is not deductive in the classical sense : no standard deductive device would accept it. (23) A and B will not go to the beach.
(24) If the weather is fine, A and B will go to the beach.
We find again the logical inversion typical of invited inference.
If we go back to the invited inference use of parce que, we get the following general schema :
(25) P parce que Q ∅ Q because P which is synonymous with (26) :
The invited inference use of parce que thus provides an argument against the argumentative or "énonciative" analysis, and shows that the connective parce que is more sensitive to propositional constraints than the "énonciative" approach predicts.
I have suggested that Ducrot's approach is coherence-oriented. I would now like to develop this point. In fact, if his description of parce que predicts the direction of the relation as a constant, and the value of the units connected as variables, it means that the pragmatic function attached to parce que is limited to the following instruction : Q is given as an argument explaining the proposition P, or the illocutionary act performed by P, or the utterance ("énonciation") of P. But this instruction cannot be an interpretive rule for parce que : it is only a sequencing rule, because what is specified is not the interpretation of the connection, but the condition for using parce que. This is a dramatic paradox, because we are faced with a theory which provides only discourse constraints (as sequencing rules), and which is unable to restrict in any way the domain of possible connections. In other words, coherence is presupposed (the presence of a connective is a sufficient condition for coherence), but not explained. This state of affairs is quite straightforward for a coherence theorist : coherence is not predictable;
all that can be predicted are certain types of discourse relations established by conventional means, that is, by discourse connectives.
I believe that this analysis is mistaken, not because coherence is predictable, but because the pragmatic function of discourse connectives is not sequential, but interpretive. In other words, I claim that connectives give instructions on how to find a relevant interpretation of the utterances, or to increase the relevance of utterances when specific discourse tasks would otherwise reduce relevance. I will argue for this thesis by considering conversational uses of parce que. These examples do not belong to the finite set of possible uses of parce que given in (8), and cannot receive the predicted "énonciative" reading. I believe that these examples are real counter-examples to Ducrot's analysis. After the analysis of these examples, I will make a more general comment on argumentation theory and relevance theory, which leads to an unexpected conclusion relative to conversation and relevance theory. In this conversation, we meet three uses of parce que, which are highly dependent on conversational routines or general scripts.
5.

(i)
The first use (PQ1) typically occurs after what conversational analysts call a presequence : its function is to introduce a justification of a previous question, a question which gives rise to an embedded exchange (A 3 -C 4 ) 10 .
(ii) The second parce que (PQ2) introduces another type of justification, which concerns the reason for the phone call.
(iii) Finally, the third use (PQ3) is typically used in French to restart the conversation (typically with the structure because if…).
The question I would like to ask is the following : is it possible to account for these uses of parce que in a theory of coherence ? My answer is no, for the following reasons :
If parce que imposes sequential constraints, this should imply that the connections conveyed by parce que are predictable; but this is not the case.
Thus, the only coherence explanation is ex post facto. If we adopt a general compositional model of dialogue, as described in Moeschler (1989a) , it 10 An embedded exchange is either a preceding or a following exchange which is subordinate to a directive constituent (act or move). we preserve the coherence model by using an ad hoc discourse routine, or
we preserve the classical analysis of the connective. But, in the latter case, we run up against the complexity of the conversational data, and the theory is unable either to describe or to explain the conversational uses of the connective.
(iii) The third reason is linked to the interpretive aspect of parce que. A coherence based approach makes connections not between the propositions expressed, but between the speech acts performed, and moreover between the acts of utterance ("énonciation"). For instance, PQ2 would receive the following paraphrase :
(28) I tell you that it doesn't matter, because I have to tell you that the baby had tummy-ache and now it seems to be over But this approach does not explain the possible "énonciative" interpretation in all its possible combinations. If we use the following variables, P and Q for propositions, F(f) for the illocutionary force attached to f, and E (f) for the act of uttering f, we obtain the following nine logical structures :
But nothing in the description can specify the appropriate structure nor predict which structures are possible and which are not possible.
After these negative statements, I would like to propose a more general positive answer to the question of how parce que is interpreted in conversation. My answer will be that parce que is narrowly associated with general scripts for conducting conversations. These are respectively scripts for opening a conversation, for reparing failure of an opening presequence, and for assigning jobs in a medical office. I propose the following more precise scripts associated with each use of parce que : b. S is associated with certain anticipatory hypotheses Hs, a sub-set of which corresponds to R.
In this case, I will say that parce que confirms an anticipatory hypothesis H belonging to R, this hypothesis being the cause of the presequence. If a presequence S fails, the speaker must give a reason for his act of communication.
In this script, to give a reason for the phone call is to give a reason for the closure of the preceding exchange (given by non mais ça fait rien). Then it is possible to draw the further contextual implication (37) If we accept the hypothesis that discourse connectives have no specific discourse function, how do they behave with respect to relevance ?
One possible answer is that parce que in conversation introduces an utterance which increases the relevance of a previous action or utterance.
For instance, the first use of parce que in conversation (27) 
Back to argumentation and relevance
Now I would like to return to argumentation theory and to relevance theory with regard to conversation in general. So far I have argued for a non-discourse-oriented approach to discourse connectives. But this result is paradoxical, because at first sight it would be logical to conclude that the best approach to discourse connectives would be a discourse theory, for example theory of argumentation. In fact, the result is not surprising, if we look at the possible ways of describing conversation within argumentation theory and within relevance theory. I think that it is possible to state the following propositions about the relation between argumentation theory and conversation on the one hand, and relevance theory and conversation on the other : 30 (39) Argumentation and conversation :
(P1) Conversation, as a type-unit, is a well defined object; as such, it obeys principles of argumentative closure.
(P2) Conversation, as a token-unit, cannot be apprehended directly :
the principles of coherence which organise it are about abstract units, that is type-units.
(P3) The uses of argumentative markers (like connectives) must be interpreted as "enunciatively" marked, when they do not correspond to predictions from their unmarked uses.
What these propositions state is that the only way to explain any discourse fact occurring within a conversation is to transform the token-unit conversation into a type-unit, which has a set of clear-cut properties :
structural properties of closure principles (for any compound units);
sequencing properties attached to the unit-types which make up the typeunit conversation; sequencing constraints attached to discourse connectives.
As we see, the properties are defined a priori. If the conversational data contradict these properties, this is not an argument against the theory itself, analyse is not incoherence as a sequential problem, but incoherence as a cognitive or interpretive problem. It is seldom the case that we do not understand a conversation in which we participate (if this is the case, the problem concerns accessibility of contexts); but it is very often the case that we do not understand a conversation we have recorded (for exactly the same reasons). Finally, the third proposition derives from the observation I have made about the uses of parce que in conversation.
If these propositions are plausible, it is not surprising that the more linguistic perspective (argumentation theory) is less suited to account for conversation, while the more pragmatic appproach (which assumes the linguistic under-determination of interpretation) is more more suited to account for conversation.
Conclusion
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The conclusion I would like to draw is very simple. As I stated at the beginning, conversation is not, for theoretical or empirical reasons, necessarily relevant for pragmatic theory or relevance theory. But, as tokenunits, conversations yield empirical data which cannot be explained by a constrained theory of discourse. Moreover, any description of pragmatic markers which aims to achieve descriptive and explanatory adequacy must be able to account for conversational data. I have tried to show that this is not possible within a discourse theory, and that this empirical criterion could be satisfied within a cognitive pragmatic theory like relevance theory.
